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THE IDEA OF GOD TODAY: THE NEO-AGNOSTIC VIEW
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
IT IS a truism nowadays that ideas and doctrines evolve just as
institutions and movements do. Old names may be used by think-
ers who have little else in common with their predecessors. The
Christian of today is not what the Christian of the middle ages, or
even of a century ago, was. The Freethinker of today is not likely
to be a follower of Robert G. Ingersoll or even of Thomas Paine.
The Positivist of today is not a rigorous follower of Auguste Comte.
Conceptions and ideas change with advance in science, with the
general spirit of the age, with all manner of currents and tendencies
which indirectly and subtly affect our habits of thought and our
use of language.
The idea of God is, of course, no exception to the rule just
referred to. That idea has undergone many changes, as scholarly
works on the subject have shown. The point of the present paper
is, however, a special one, in a sense. The idea of God is changing,
as it were, before our own eyes. The discussion of it takes a line
that would hardly have been possible even a decade ago.
Under what influences is the change in question being effected?
It is hard to say. The new psychology is one factor ; the philosophi-
cal study of the development and evolution of language is another;
anthropology and what may be called descriptive sociology'—an
inexact phrase, of course—have of late rendered great service to
the cause of sober and honest thinking on the subject of religion.
The new logic and the new view of the mission and scope of philoso-
phy have contributed to the result in question.
Those who entertain lingering doubts concerning the decline and
disappearance of the crude theological notion of a personal God—the
God of the Bible, if the Bible be given a literal interpretation—or
the misty and nebulous metaphysical notion of God—the power in
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the universe which makes for righteousness—would do well, to read
and re-read such significant books as Prof. James H. Leubas, The
Belief in God and luuiiortality. Prof. C. O. Beckwith's The Idea of
God, and Prof. A. J. Leighton's Religion and the Mind of Today.
To contrast the tone, spirit and method of these works with the
manner of matter of Mr. Balfour's lately republished Foundations
of Belief, is to become aware of a difference of atmosphere, of per-
spective and of background. It was easy enough to refute Mr. Bal-
lour a quarter of a century ago; indeed, Huxley and Spencer per-
formed that operation with neatness and thoroughness. Today, no
well-informed student of belief and its foundations cares to argue
with Mr. Balfour. His argument strikes one as irrelevant, antiquated,
pointless.
The truth has dawned on the modern mind that there is, in real-
ity, no "idea" of God. The term is still freely used, but those who
use it are totally unable to attach any half definite meaning to it.
They know that, if they try to define it, language fails them and
the mind reels. The modern man, even if but slightly educated,
cannot seriously maintain that there is a place which may be called
"heaven" and another place which may be called "hell," and that
God presides over the former and issues orders and decrees, after the
manner of a sublunar autocrat and thus governs the universe and
everything beyond it. Such infantile notions are no longer enter-
tained even by those "fundamentalists" who think, or say, they
entertain them.
When driven into a corner, some thoughtful people who adhere
to orthodox phrases declare that, of course, God is not a person, but
a super-person. No one, they admit, can imagine his form or appear-
ance, but it is convenient to think of him as possessing human fonn
and human qualities—that is, the very finest and noblest of our
qualities, such as love, tenderness, all-embracing charity. This posi-
tion seems plausible enough, until one analyzes it.
In the first place, what is the possible meaning of "super-person
or super-personality? When we speak of supermen we think of men
who are physically, mentally and morally superior to the average
man, or even to the highest known product of human evolution. A
tall, handsome, distinguished, high-minded, mtellectual, attractive,
courageous and courteous man would be called a superman. A
genius though physically defective, might be called a superman. But
how childish it would be to apply such notions of super-personality,
or super-humanity, to an unknowable, inconceivable power supposed
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to be capable of creating and ruling our universe and every other
universe—or whatever we may call it—beyond it
!
It is simply and patently impossible for human beings to transcend
their onm experience and imagination. There is, of course, racial
experience in addition to individual ; racial experience is registered
in the whole nervous system—according to modern science—and
we become dimly aware of it when we act contrary to reason and to
the lessons of limited personal experience under the compulsion of
mstincts, innate proclivities, categorical imperatives, and the like.
In either case, when we come to attach names to things, to feelings,
to states of mind and to situations we are of necessity limited to the
region of experience. Something is seen, felt, thought, imagined
which requires a name. The savage, the primitive man, the man of
Biblical culture severally knew what they meant by God. Their
ideas were very definite—if wrong and crude. When the Hebrew
prophet of old spoke of "the Lord," he made a powerful impression,
because his Monotheism was simple and austere. When we modems
speak of the "spirit that is God," we use words literally without
meaning.
But are there not, some will object, terms that, although ex-
tremely vague and indefinable, yet stand for great realities ? What,
for example, is the definition of "beauty"? No two writers on
aesthetics give the same definition, and the probability is that no
exact definition of beauty will ever be offered. Yet do we not know
that beauty exists? Do we not worship beauty? Why not use the
term God in the same way, and why not worship God?
This line of reasoning is undoubtedly plausible. But it points
to confusion of thought. The term beauty is an abstraction. We
know that when we speak of beauty we conjure up fleeting and
alluring images of beautiful persons, beautiful scenery, beautiful
flowers, beautiful pages, beautiful pictures. It is the experiences
with a multitude of things and forms that please and charm us that
has given rise to the abstract notion of beauty. But what experi-
ences have given rise to the abstract pseudo-idea of God? The
finite cannot suggest the infinite. We have no experience whatever
that is not explicable by the constitution and nature of the finite
mind.
Every attempt at defining "God," when closely analyzed, brings
us back to misinterpreted experience of something that is finite, lim-
ited
—
pathetically limited. Take two or three illustrations.
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'"God is love," some schools tell us with an air of superior wis-
dom and freedom from crude superstition. What do we know of
lover' We derive the idea from the love we have felt, the love we
have observed, the love we have read and heard about. We love
human beings, animals, flowers, ideas, institutions. We know that
animals love. We do )wt think that there is love between the sun and
the planets in the solar system. We do not think that there is love
between the atoms in the molecule or between the component units
of the atom. Love is the name rational people give to a sentiment,
an emotion felt by sentient beings. Is God an emotion of a sentient
being? The question is absurd; then the phrase, "God is love." is
meaningless. Why, then, use it?
"God is the principle of goodness whereby the world lives and
steadily advances to perfection." Again, what is a principle? The
term was coined by educated men and means, in all scientific dis-
cussion, a basic proposition, a cardinal rule, etc. We speak of the
principles of economics, the principles of ethics, the principles of
jurisprudence, the principles of psychology. How can God be a
basic proposition or cardinal rule, and how can a proposition be God ?
Or take this definition—Prof. Leighton's : God is "the supreme
source and ground of the spiritual qualities of persons, of rational
and moral individuals," or. in other words, "the eternal perfection
of that type of being which, in our human order, we call spiritual
individuality or personality."
What we mean by the spiritual qualities of human beings is quite
clear. Love of justice and mercy, love of beauty, the sentiment of
generosity, moral courage and devotion to truth regardless of nar-
row expediency are spiritual qualities. We possess them, and we
are certain that the perfect man will always and naturally live up
to them. But these qualities have been evolved exactly as the less
noble, or more self-regarding, sentiments have been evolved. Ani-
mals are not destitute of spiritual qualities ; they love, they make
sacrifices. There is no reason to suppose that there is one source or
ground for spiritual qualities and another for non-spiritual. If God
is the name for some unknown and unknowable source of spiritual
qualities, what is the source and ground of the others, and what
name shall we give them—the Devil? This would be harking back
to childish theology with a vengeance. We gain absolutely nothing
by calling our qualities, or their source, God. And it is presumptuous
to imply that God is only a perfect man.
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Once more: God is simply a name for the inconceivable power
which created the totality of things we call nature. Since self-crea-
tion is inconceivable, we are driven by the constitution of our mind
to assume that some kind of creative force existed, exists and will
continue to exist forever.
This, clearly, is the familiar Paley argument in a modern form.
We see a watch, or any other piece of mechanism, and we conclude
that some one made it. We behold our universe, infer existence
beyond it, and we conclude that some power created all that is. But
why is a creator conceivable and self-creation not? In truth, is not
the creator, by the hypothesis, self-created? Even children ask,
"who created God?" We laugh at that naive query, but the wisest
man cannot show zvhy it is ridiculous. If we cannot conceive self-
creation, we cannot conceive creation by a self-created power. The
words, then, have no meaning. Why use them?
Roth propositions in truth are verbal and empty. They convey
nothing to the human mind.
No alternative is left except this—that, it is useful, for practical
moral purposes, to adopt the God hypothesis and to suppose that
God—or the power above, below and in all things—is benevolent in
our human sense of the word. In science and philosophy, it is
pointed out. hypotheses are absolutely indispensable. Facts only
begin to acquire significance when we regard them in the light of a
theory. This is indisputably true, but in science and philosophy,
when we frame and put forward a hypothesis, the words in the
formula have meaning. The hypothesis itself is of use. We discard
it when it fails to account for all of the facts, and frame another.
The God hypothesis is not of scientific origin ; it has served no sci-
entific purpose. It was an absolutely natural hypothesis in the
infancy of the human race, and it has been modified from time to
time to correspond to tests and demands of advancing intelligence.
Today further modification, in the sense of attenuation and refine-
ment. wmII not suffice ; even men and women deeply religious are
not content with the hypothesis ; they would rather take the frankly
Agnostic position than profess beliefs wdiich they cannot rationally
entertain.
Furthermore, the God hypothesis is no longer useful for moral
purposes. Professor Leuba. in the work above referred to, deals
with this question at considerable length, and with ability and knowl-
edge. Here it is necessary to make only a few point? deserving of
particular attention.
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In the first place, the God hypothesis does not help us in the
smallest degree to solve the problem of evil. From Job down to
Professor Jacks and other contemporary thinkers, that problem is
evaded, not faced. We are told that evil may not be evil—a ques-
tion-begging argument. Pain and suffering, especially when not
deserved by sin and crime, are evil to the human mind and heart,
and a just and omnipotent God would not inflict them. "Evil is the
price of discipline and character building," suggest some. They
assume, without proof, that evil develops character, although there
is evidence to the contrary, and they overlook the reasonable objec-
tion that a benevolent and omnipotent God would have devised more
acceptable means of building character. They reason in a circle.
When convicted of this beyond all escape, they fall back on the
ancient plea that poor, groping, limited beings like ourselves can-
not hope to comprehend the ways of God!
Where, then, are we?' We cannot comprehend the ways of God.
We cannot grasp the idea of God. We cannot reconcile our hypothe-
sis of a benevolent and omnipotent creator with the facts of life.
We cannot solve a single moral problem with the aid of that hypothe-
sis. What problems we manage to solve, we solve scientiiically.
What and where, then, is the value of the God hypothesis?
The Agnostic answer is, the hypothesis has been shorn and de-
prived of real value. Tlic conclusion is not an agreeable one ; indeed,
the Agnostic position as a whole is unpleasant and humiliating. One
cannot help wishing—futile as that is—the htmian mind had a longer
reach than it has. It is disheartening to feel that the wisest among
us is ignorant and hopelessly unequal to the solution of the problems
which concern us most vitally and deeply. What is the ultimate
purpose of existence, and what the destiny of man, the highest prod-
uct of evolution so far? Has existence a meaning, and, if so, what
is that meaning? Alas, we cannot scientifically answer these poig-
nant questions. We are bound, being human, progressive and curious,
to frame hvpotheses ; but we must not and cannot adhere to theories
which find little support in known facts and fail to account for other
facts. Above all, we must be honest with ourselves and with others,
and make no statement that is unintelligible even to ourselves. Reli-
gion and philosophy must be reconstructed—are being reconstructed.
There is much in past thought that we can take over and utilize : but
let us be sure we know what we take from the oast, whv we take it.
and what we propose to do with it in more scientific, philosophical
and coherent svstcms.
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Not that mysticism has no place in life and thought. It may
have a very important place. But the mystic can only appeal to
Other mystics. Those who have not had his actual or fancied experi-
ences can attach no weight to his "proofs" ; to offer proof is to adopt
the tests of science, to acquiesce in the results of such tests. Let the
mystic who asserts he is certain of the existence and presence of God
tell us how we may achieve like certainty, like communion, a like
sense of presence. Let him even plead for free play for the will to
believe—in other words, for the provisional adoption of his particu-
lar hypothesis. This is legitimate, as we have seen. But if, with the
best will in the world, we fail to verify his hypothesis, to repeat his
experience, he cannot censure us for rejecting his hypothesis and
framing another, or for suspending even tentative and provisional
opinions till the right amount of evidence of the right quality—scien-
tific evidence, in a word—is available and a new working theory
becomes profitable and serviceable.
We may add, in conclusion, that there will never be a dearth of
theories. We frame them too readily, rather than too reluctantly.
The neo-Agnostic does not dogmatize. He does not deny proposi-
tions that he does not understand, and does not issue sweeping
denials of all possible propositions concerning God or purpose in
creation. He denies only propositions which he knows to be arbi-
trary, false or absurd, and he asks for explanations and definitions
of terms in propositions which appear to carry meaning but do not
really possess any.
